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Abstract
Explicit targets for the composition of assets traded by governments are
necessary for fiscal-monetary policy to determine the stochastic paths of in-
flation or exchange rates; this is the case even if fiscal policy is non-Ricardian.
Targets obtain with the traditional conduct of monetary policy and Credit
Easing, but not with unconventional policy and Quantitative Easing. The
composition of the portfolios traded by monetary-fiscal authorities deter-
mines premia in asset and currency markets.
Key words: quantitative easing; exchange rates
JEL classification numbers: E50; F41.
1 Introduction
Unconventional monetary-fiscal policy take many forms, but a general dis-
tinction can be made between quantitative policies, that focus on the ex-
pansion of the balance sheet of the central bank and the related creation of
reserves, but, importantly, do not restrict the mix of assets in the balance
sheet, and credit policies, that target the allocation of credit across assets
on the balance sheet; Bernanke et al. (2004) make the point. The contrast
is highlighted by the recent policies of the Federal Reserve with those of the
Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. Indeed, at the Stamp Lecture at
the London School of Economics, Bernanke (2009) explained that the un-
conventional policies of the Fed are distinct from those of the Bank of Japan
in 2001-2006 in that the composition of assets held by the Fed are central
to the achievement of its policy objectives, and named it “Credit Easing”
(CE).1 This contrasts with the first round of quantitative easing undertaken
by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and 2006, that he labelled “Quantita-
tive Easing” (QE), as they had focused on the quantities of bank reserves.2
The “Asset Purchase Facility” of the Bank of England has features of both
CE and QE. First established in January 2009, it was designed to increase
the monetary base by £200 billion by purchasing various assets at market
determined rates and quantities. Although the emphasis of the scheme was
the amount of assets purchased, in effect the APF was restricted to medium
and long-term gilts.
In practice, unconventional policies in practice display features of both
pure QE and pure CE regimes. Nevertheless, it is instructive to understand
the implications of each regime separately. Here, we examine the effects of
pure QE and pure CE policies on the path of inflation and exchange rates.
We show that QE, unlike CE, prevents Central Banks from using short-term
nominal interest rates to determine the path of inflation and exchange rates.
The path of short-term interest rates determines the expected rate of infla-
tion and expected exchange rate, but not their distribution. We consider a
large open, dynamic stochastic, cash-in-advance economy with flexible prices
and a perfect, in particular complete, asset market in each country (cur-
rency). We assume a non-Ricardian seigniorage policy for the central bank
so as to remain in an environment that typically yields a determinate price
1The “Maturity Extension Program,” that extended the average maturity of Treasury
holdings was a version of “Operation Twist,” implemented in the early 1960’s, that sought
to “twist” the yield curve by lowering longer-term yields while keeping the short rates at
existing levels.
2Ugai (2007) discusses the experience of the Bank of Japan with Quantitative Easing,
and Maeda et al. (2005) the monetary operations employed.
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level, in spite of the evident criticisms of the fiscal theory of the price level,
such as those in Buiter (2002) and Dre`ze and Polemarchakis (2000). We also
assume that only domestic currency be used for transactions in each country
(else the indeterminacy result in Kareken and Wallace (1981) obtains) and
that the budget constraints of the monetary-fiscal authority in each country
are satisfied independently in each country (else the indeterminacy in Dupor
(2000) obtains). We show that the stochastic distributions of inflation and
exchange rates are a consequence of the manner in which monetary author-
ities adjust their portfolios over time. The absence of adequate targets for
the composition of assets under pure QE regimes, in contrast to pure CE
and conventional policy, proliferates indeterminacy.3 Curdia and Woodford
(2011) similarly define QE as lending to the private sector restricted only by
a target quantity of reserves while credit easing refers to the purchases of
government bonds. Note that a managed exchange rate does not resolve the
indeterminacy, but transmits foreign fluctuations in inflation to the domes-
tic economy. Evidently, indeterminacy is nominal only as long as prices are
flexible, monetary policy sets nominal rates of interest, and the asset market
is complete; otherwise, there are, generically, real effects.
Expositions of the fiscal theory of the price level, as in Woodford (1994)
and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) in a closed economy, and Dupor (2000)
in an open economy, typically assume that monetary authorities trade exclu-
sively in short term, nominally risk free bonds. Woodford (1994) and Dupor
(2000) highlights the importance of the present value of the monetary-fiscal
authority budget constraint in the determination of the price level, while
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) highlight the importance, state-by-state, of
the monetary authority budget constraint. However, by implicitly restricting
attention to conventional policy, all fail to highlight the importance of the
portfolio composition assumption for the claim of determinacy of the path
of prices and exchange rates. In a closed economy, McMahon et al. (2014)
develop the argument and draw implications of the conduct of unconven-
tional policies on the path of inflation. This is consistent with the need for
“comprehensive monetary policy”, of Dre`ze and Polemarchakis (2000), that
restricts the stochastic path of the term structure of interest rates in order
to determine the path of inflation. This theme was later developed in Adao
et al. (2014), and Magill and Quinzii (2014a) in a closed economy setting
though they did not make the connection with quantitative easing.4 These
3Conventional monetary policy sets a target for the short-term (here, one period) inter-
est rate, and it conducts open market operations or repo transactions that conform to an
ex ante determined overall portfolio composition; in particular, one that has an exclusive
focus on Treasuries of short maturity.
4There is a vast and important literature on indeterminacy of monetary equilibria:
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papers obtain determinacy by targeting or restricting the return on assets.
Our point here is that the instrument of immediate policy relevance is the
composition of the balance sheet of the monetary authority and adequate
attention to it permits (under CE) or prevents (under QE) the targeting of
a desired path of prices and exchange rates.
One of the objectives of unconventional monetary policies has been to
affect long-term interest rates and asset prices by altering the portfolio of
securities held. In the last few years, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England purchased similar quantities of bonds, relative to both the size of
their economies and to the stocks of outstanding government debt. Their
effects have also been similar.5 However there is debate in the literature
about whether the effects are due to changes in expectations of future interest
rates (the signalling channel), or changes in risk premia (the portfolio balance
channel).6
The portfolio balance channel operates when bonds of different maturities
are not perfect substitutes and traders have have maturity-specific bond de-
mands. In this setting, the maturity structure of outstanding debt can affect
term premia. Theoretical models describing the portfolio balance channel
such as Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Hamilton and Wu (2012) neglect the
consequences of variations in the composition of the monetary authority port-
folio on the stochastic path of inflation. We show that as the composition of
the portfolios of monetary-fiscal authorities determine the stochastic path of
prices, they also determine the nominal stochastic discount factor. Indepen-
Sargent and Wallace (1975) pointed out the indeterminacy of the initial price level under
interest rate policy; Lucas and Stokey (1987) derived the condition for the uniqueness of a
recursive equilibrium with money supply policy; Woodford (1994) analysed the dynamic
paths of equilibria associated with the indeterminacy of the initial price level under money
supply policy. In this paper, we give the exact characterisation of recursive equilibria un-
der quantitative easing with interest rate policy. The possible multiplicity of stochastic
inflation paths at equilibrium was clear in Bloise et al. (2005) and Nakajima and Pole-
marchakis (2005); there, in a Ricardian specification, the indeterminacy in a monetary
economy was parametrised by the price level and a nominal martingale measure. Magill
and Quinzii (2014b) emphasised an equivalent role for inflationary expectations.
5A cumulative decline of 91 basis points in the 10-year US Treasury yield following
eight key announcements about the Feds first programme of large-scale asset purchases
(LSAP) was reported by Gagnon et al. (2011). In the UK, Joyce et al. (2011) report
that six key quantitative easing announcements led to a fall of about 100 basis points in
long-term UK government bond (gild) yields.
6Gagnon et al. (2011) and Joyce et al. (2011) suggest that the portfolio balance channel
dominated in the US and UK. On the other hand Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) finds
evidence of the signaling channel in the US and the portfolio balance channel in the UK.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) find evidence on both safe and risky assets
for the signalling channel by considering changes in money-market futures rates.
3
dent of changes in expectations about the path of short-term interest rates,
the correlation between the discount factor and asset prices, and nominal ex-
change rates, then generates risk premia and biases whose size and direction
corresponds to the chosen portfolio composition.
Since the global financial crisis of 2007, there is an emerging view that
variations in the capital account should be examined if not managed, and
that these variations may stem from the monetary policy of trading part-
ners (see, for example, Rey (2013)). Our results contributes to this view by
highlighting that QE proliferates indeterminacy in central bank portfolios
and consequently the path of exchange rates, and, if markets were incom-
plete within each country, then fluctuations in central bank portfolios would
resonate abroad not only by affecting the nominal exchange rate, but also
directly to asset prices and premia globally. Furthermore, if central banks
set interest rates according to a Taylor-type rule that accounts for changes in
the nominal exchange rate7, and trading partners conducted QE, then they
would not be able to guarantee the desired outcomes can be implemented. In
other words, QE by trading partners would manifest itself as indeterminacy
of both nominal and real risk-premia, globally, and more importantly, even
in countries that conducted traditional monetary policy or CE.
The analytical argument
Monetary policy involves Quantitative Easing (QE) if open market operations
extend to unrestricted portfolios of government bonds of different maturities
or bonds (or assets) issued by the private sector. It involves Credit Easing
(CE) if open market operations extend beyond treasuries, but still target a
specific composition for the balance sheet of the monetary-fiscal authority; as
a limit case, monetary policy is conventional when open market operations
are restricted to short term, nominally risk-free assets (treasury bills).
Fiscal policy is Ricardian if it is restricted to satisfy an intertemporal bud-
get constraint or transversality condition; equivalently, if public debt vanishes
for all possible, equilibrium or non-equilibrium, values of prices and interest
rates. It is non-Ricardian, if it is not restricted to satisfy an intertemporal
budget constraint; in particular, outside money or initial liabilities of the
public towards the private sector are not taxed back.
QE generates indeterminacy indexed by a nominal pricing measure over
states of the world. This measure determines the distribution of rates of
inflation, up to a moment that is determined by the risk-free rate and non-
arbitrage, and the distribution of exchange rates, up to a moment that is
7For a discussion on such rules see Taylor (2001).
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determined by the ratio of risk-free rates across countries and no arbitrage.
Ricardian policy leaves the initial price level and nominal exchange rate in-
determinate as well. Determinacy and, by extension, monetary and financial
stability, obtain under CE or monetary policy that is conventional and, re-
quire, possibly, fiscal policy that is non-Ricardian.
A stochastic dynamic economy 8
Time, t, is discrete, and it extends into the infinite future. Events, st, at each
date, are finitely many. An immediate successor of a date-event is st+1|st,
and, inductively, a successor is st+k|st. Conditional on st, probabilities of suc-
cessors are f(st+1|st) and, inductively, f(st+k|st) = f(st+k|st+k−1)f(st+k−1|st).
There are two countries in the world, home and foreign, each inhabited
by a representative agent. Foreign variables, both macro and those relating
to foreign agents, will be denoted with an asterisk (*). The transactions
of agents in the home and foreign country will be denoted with a subscript
“h” and “f,” respectively. It suffices to specify explicitly mostly only the
constraints and variables relevant for the home agent and country.
At a date-event, a perishable non-tradable input, labor, l(st), is employed
to produce a perishable domestic tradable output, consumption, y(st), ac-
cording to a linear technology:
y(st) = a(st)l(st), a(st) > 0.
The representative home individual is endowed with 1 unit of leisure at
every date-event. He supplies non-tradable labor and demands the tradeable
consumption good, and he derives utility according to the cardinal utility
index u(c(st), 1 − l(st)) that satisfies standard monotonicity, curvature and
boundary conditions. The preferences of the individual over consumption-
employment paths commencing at st are described by the separable, von
Neumann-Morgenstern, intertemporal utility function
u(c(st), 1− l(st)) + Est
∑
k>0
βku(c(st+k|st), 1− l(st+k|st)), 0 < β < 1.
Balances, mh(s
t) and mf (s
t) provide liquidity services in the home and
foreign country respectively. Elementary securities, θ(st+1|st), serve to trans-
fer wealth to and from immediate successor date-events. The price level is
p(st), and the wage rate is w(st) = a(st)p(s
t), as profit maximisation requires.
8The specification is an extension of McMahon, Peiris, and Polemarchakis (2014) and
Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005), similar in spirit to Lucas (1982) and Geanakoplos
and Tsomocos (2002).
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The nominal, risk-free interest rate is r(st). As the goods produced in each
country are perfect substitutes, the law-of-one-price holds and determines
the exchange rate e∗(st) = p(st)/p∗(st).
At each date-event, the asset market opens after the uncertainty, st, has
realized, and, as a consequence, purchases and sales in the markets for la-
bor and the consumption good are subject to standard cash-in-advance con-
straints; the effective cash-in-advance constraint is9
a(st)p(st)l(st) ≤ mh(st), 0 ≤ m∗f (st).
Prices of elementary securities are
q(st+1|st) = ν(s
t+1|st)
1 + r(st)
,
with ν(·|st) a “nominal pricing measure,” which guarantees the non-arbitrage
relation ∑
st+1|st
q(st+1|st) = 1
1 + r(st)
.
Inductively,
ν(st+k|st) = ν(st+k|st+k−1)ν(st+k−1|st), k > 1,
and the implicit price of revenue at successor date-events is
q(st+k|st) = ν(s
t+k|st+k−1)
1 + r(st+k−1)
q(st+k−1|st), k > 1.
Note that the nominal prices of elementary securities and the “nominal
pricing measure” are unique to the currency in which they are denominated.
As there are a complete set of state-contingent bonds in each currency, the
prices of securities which deliver currency in the same state are related by
the following no-arbitrage condition
ν∗(st+1|st)
ν(st+1|st)
{
1 + r(st)
1 + r∗(st)
}
=
e∗(st+1|st)
e∗(st)
.
In other words, the path of nominal exchange rates depends on the ratio of
the “nominal pricing measure” across countries and implies the uncovered
interest parity condition
1 + r(st)
1 + r∗(st)
e∗(st) =
∑
st+1|st
ν(st+1|st)e∗(st+1|st).
9Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005) provide an explicit derivation.
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This gives the risk-neutral expected exchange rate. As markets are com-
plete, variations in the nominal equivalent martingale measure in each coun-
try only have nominal effects on the implicit premium in the exchange rate10.
If there were nominal rigidities or frictions which prevented the law of one
price from holding, then the covariance between the nominal equivalent mar-
tingale measure and nominal exchange rate, and hence the premium in ex-
pected exchange rates, would imply different allocations of (real) resources.
The individual has initial nominal wealth τh(s
t) and τf (s
t) in each coun-
try. Initial wealth constitutes a claim against the respective monetary-fiscal
authority; alternatively, it can be interpreted as outside money. It is ex-
ogenous in a non-Ricardian specification. In a Ricardian specification, it
is set endogenously so as to satisfy the transversality condition imposed on
monetary-fiscal policy.
The flow budget constraint is11
p(st)ch(s
t) + e∗(st)p∗(st)cf (st) +m(st)
+
∑
st+1|st
{
q(st+1|st)θh(st+1|st) + e∗(st)q∗(st+1|st)θf (st+1|st)
}
≤ p(st)a(st)l(st) + τh(st) + e∗(st)τf (st).
Debt limit constraints are
τh(s
t) + e∗(st)τf (st) ≥ −
∑
k>0
∑
st+k|st
q(st+k|st) 1
1 + r(st)
a(st+k)
or, equivalently,
lim
k→∞
∑
st+k|st
q(st+k|st){τh(st+k|st) + e∗(st+k|st)τf (st+k|st)} ≥ 0.
Wealth at successor date-events is
τh(s
t+1|st) = θ(st+1|st) +m(st) and τf (st+1|st) = θf (st+1|st),
and, after elimination of the trade in assets and using the law-of-one-price,
the flow budget constraint reduces to
p(st)z(st) +
r(st)
1 + r(st)
a(st)p(st)l(st) +
∑
st+1
q(st+1|st)τ(st+1|st) ≤ τ(st),
10The difference between the risk neutral and objective expected exchange rate.
11Foreign money balances are dominated by foreign bonds and are zero in equilibrium,
while the effective cash-in-advance constraint guarantees that domestic money balances
are positive.
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where z(st) = c(st)−a(st)l(st) is the effective excess demand for consumption,
c(st) is the sum of consumption at home and abroad and τ(st) = τh(s
t) +
e∗(st)τf (st).
Alternatively, m˜(st) = (1/p(st))m(st) are real balances, τ˜(st) = (1/p(st))
τ(st) is real wealth, pi(st+1|st) = (p(st+1)/(p(st)) − 1 is the rate of inflation,
and
q˜(st+1|st) = q(st+1|st)(1 + pi(st+1|st)) = ν(s
t+1|st)(1 + pi(st+1|st))
1 + r(st)
are prices of indexed elementary securities12.
Real wealth at successor date-events is
τ˜(st+1|st) =
(
θ(st+1|st) +m(st) + e∗(st+1|st)θ(st+1|st)
p(st)
)
1
1 + pi(st+1|st) ,
and the flow budget constraint reduces to
z(st) +
r(st)
1 + r(st)
a(st)l(st) +
∑
st+1
q˜(st+1|st)τ˜(st+1|st) ≤ τ˜(st).
First order conditions for an optimum are
∂u(c(st),1−l(st))
∂c(st)
= ∂u(c(s
t),1−l(st))
∂l(st)
(
a(st)
1+r(st)
)−1
,
βf(st+1|st)∂u(c(st+1),1−l(st+1))
∂c(st+1)
q˜(st+1|st)−1 = ∂u(c(st),1−l(st))
∂c(st)
,
and the transversality condition is
lim
k→∞
∑
st+k|st
q˜(st+k|st)τ˜(st+k|st) = 0.
The monetary-fiscal authority in each country sets domestic one period
rates of interest and accommodates the demand for domestic balances. It
supplies domestic balances, M(st), and trades in elementary securities sub-
ject to a flow budget constraint that, after elimination of the trade in assets,
reduces to
T (st) ≤ r(s
t)
1 + r(st)
M(st) +
∑
st+1|st
q(st+1|st)T (st+1|st),
12From the no-arbitrage condition for assets, this is also the same in the foreign country.
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where T (st) and, similarly, T (st+1|st) are obligations towards the private
sector. They are decomposed as T (st+1|st) = M(st) + Θ(st+1|st) where
Θ(st+1|st) are trades in elementary securities at home13.
Ricardian policy imposes on monetary-fiscal policy the transversality con-
dition
lim
k→∞
∑
st+k|st
q(st+k|st)T (st+k|st) = 0
or, equivalently, as prices vary, it sets the initial claims of the private sector
as
T (st) =
r(st)
1 + r(st)
M(st) +
∑
k>0
∑
st+k|st
r(st+k|st)
1 + r(st+k|st)q(s
t+k|st)M(st+k|st).
For equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that the excess demand for
output vanishes:
z(st) + z∗(st) = c(st) + c∗(st)− a(st)l(st)− a∗(st)l∗(st) = 0,
which determines the path of employment and consumption for each house-
hold:
∂u(c(st), 1− l(st))
∂c(st)
=
∂u(c(st), 1− l(st))
∂l(st)
(
a(st)
1 + r(st)
)−1
;
in turn, this determines the prices of indexed elementary securities:
βf(st+1|st)∂u(c(s
t+1), 1− l(st+1))
∂c(st+1)
q˜(st+1|st)−1 = ∂u(c(s
t), 1− l(st))
∂c(st)
.
The initial price level serves to guarantee that, at equilibrium, the transver-
sality condition of the monetary-fiscal authority holds. If monetary-fiscal
policy is Ricardian, the price level remains indeterminate.
More importantly, without further restrictions, as is the case under QE,
the decomposition of equilibrium asset prices into an inflation process, pi(·|st),
and a nominal pricing measure, ν(·|st), remains indeterminate: if the nominal
pricing measure, ν(·|st), is specified arbitrarily, the inflation process, pi(·|st),
adjusts to implement the equilibrium; that is, to satisfy
q˜(st+1|st) = ν(s
t+1|st)(1 + pi(st+1|st))
1 + r(st)
.
13For ease of exposition we restrict each monetary-fiscal authority to only trade domestic
assets.
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Furthermore, the path of the nominal exchange rate remains indetermi-
nate. Arbitrary nominal pricing measures in each country determine the
stochastic future exchange rate to satisfy
ν∗(st+1|st)
ν(st+1|st)
{
1 + r(st)
1 + r∗(st)
}
e∗(st) = e∗(st+1|st).
Under CE or under conventional monetary-fiscal policy, determinacy ob-
tains; we postpone the argument to the stationary case to avoid repetition.
Concerning the indeterminacy that obtains, further remarks are in order:
1. Our results under unconventional quantitative policies remain valid if
the law of one price failed to hold, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), or if
there were pricing rigidities. However, in these cases the indeterminacy
may have real effects.
2. The indeterminacy under QE obtained is not a consequence of devi-
ations from steady-state equilibria and will not be eliminated by an
interest rate feed-back rule, such as a “Taylor rule”. This will be dis-
cussed at the end of the following section to avoid repetition. The non-
stationary equilibria results presented above allow for extreme paths
inflation and exchange rates. As the Fisher equation only guarantees
an expected rate of inflation, it is entirely possible that there are paths
of ever increasing inflation and a path of ever decreasing inflation (de-
flation), and consequently large stochastic changes in nominal exchange
rates, and is reminiscent of the literature on speculative hyperinflation
such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983).
3. Our requirement that the present-value budget constraints of the monetary-
fiscal authority in each country be satisfied individually is not innocu-
ous. Equilibrium only requires that the individual household budget
constraints are satisfied, and as a consequence, only the joint budget
constraint of the two government budget constraints will be satisfied.
In that case the non-Ricardian assumption only guarantees that the
present value of the monetary liabilities of both central banks, weighted
by the exchange rate, equals the initial nominal wealth, also weighted
by the exchange rate. As a consequence, neither the price levels in
each country nor the exchange rate is determinate. This is the point
of Dupor (2000). Here, the non-Ricardian assumption in each country
results in the price-level in each country to be uniquely determined.
The subsequent indeterminacy is then restricted to the indeterminacy
of the stochastic path of inflation, and is convenient to identify the role
that QE plays in generating this indeterminacy.
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4. A managed exchange rate, satisfying uncovered interest parity, will
either transmit or eliminate the indeterminacy. If, for arguments sake,
the home country conducts traditional monetary policy (and has a
determinate path of inflation), then the foreign country may partake
in quantitative easing and provided that they also target a path of the
exchange rate, then the law-of-one-price guarantees that foreign prices
are also determinate. If, however, the home country also conducts
quantitative easing, then management of the path of the exchange rate
leaves the rates of inflation in each country indeterminate. This is
because the law-of-one-price only determines the ratio of prices across
countries to equal the nominal exchange rate, but the (stochastic) levels
are left free.
5. Our argument allows monetary-fiscal authorities to arbitrarily select
the composition of initial assets, and independently of the initial quan-
tity of money and price level, which are determined by the initial fiscal
liabilities. Our argument is valid when the monetary-fiscal authority
attempts to affect the initial quantity of money by purchasing assets
with newly printed money: this would be analagus to increasing the
outstanding liabilities that need to be returned through seignorage prof-
its
6. The argument holds for the policies of unwinding of quantitive easing
that are dependent on realized rates of inflation. This will be made
more explicit in the following section, but intuitively, the monetary-
fiscal authority here are faced with a new portfolio every period, due to
the one-period contracts we focus on. This implies that the degrees of
indeterminacy are S − 1 in each country and state. Hence, even if the
initial portfolio composition is fixed, the consequent evolution of the
portfolio (ie the unwinding phase) is not and indeterminacy will result.
A stationary economy
The argument extends to stationary economies and stationary equilibria or
steady states.
The resolution of uncertainty follows a stationary stochastic process. El-
ementary states of the world are s, finitely many, and transition probabilities
are f(s′|s).
Rates of interest, (r(s), r∗(s)) determine the path of consumption, (c(s), c∗(s))
and employment, (l(s), l∗(s)) at equilibrium, which, in turn, determine the
11
prices of indexed elementary securities:
βf(s′|s)∂u(c(s
′), 1− l(s′))
∂c(s′)
q˜(s′|s)−1 = ∂u(c(s), 1− l(s))
∂c(s)
or
Q˜ = βDu(s)−1FDu(s′).
Note that the prices of indexed elementary securities is independent of the
country. The nominal elementary securities, and hence martingale measures,
across countries differ in their stochastic rates of inflation (and consequently
the no-arbitrage condition).
Here,
Du(s) = diag(. . . ,
∂u(c(s), 1− l(s))
∂c(s)
, . . .)
is the diagonal matrix of marginal utilities of consumption, and
F = (f(s′|s)) and Q˜ = (q˜(s′|s))
are, respectively, the matrices of transition probabilities and of prices of
indexed elementary securities.
For the home household,
m˜ = (. . .
r(s)
1 + r(s)
a(s)l(s) . . .)
is the vector of net, real balances at equilibrium,
z˜ = (. . . z(s) . . .)
is the vector of excess demands and the real wealth at the steady state is
given by
τ˜ = (. . . τ(s), . . .).
τ˜ is determined by by the equations
z˜ + m˜+ Q˜τ˜ = τ˜ or τ˜ = (I − Q˜)−1 [z˜ + m˜] .
z˜∗ + m˜∗ + Q˜τ˜ ∗ = τ˜ ∗ or τ˜ ∗ = (I − Q˜)−1 [z˜∗ + m˜∗] .
The real wealth of the monetary-fiscal authorities in the home country,
T˜ , is determined by
M˜ + Q˜T˜ = T˜ or T˜ = (I − Q˜)−1M˜,
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where M˜ = (. . . r(s)
1+r(s)
a(s)l(s) . . .) and, since F is a Markov transition
matrix, while M˜  0, the real claims against the monetary-fiscal authority
at the steady state are strictly positive:
T˜  0.
Note that the real claims against the monetary-fiscal authorities can only
be jointly determined, T˜ + T˜ ∗ = τ˜ + τ˜ ∗.
As we have solved the entire real economy without nominal variables, the
initial price level in each country remains indeterminate. More importantly,
the decomposition of equilibrium asset prices into an inflation process, pi(·|s),
and a nominal pricing measure, ν(·|s), remain indeterminate in each country.
For the home country:
Q˜ = R−1N ⊗ Π.
Here,
R = diag(. . . , (1 + r(s)), . . .)
is the diagonal matrix of interest factors, and
N = (ν(s′|s)) , Π = ((1 + pi(s′|s))) , and E = (e∗(s′|s)/e∗(s))
are, respectively, the matrices of “nominal pricing transition probabilities”,
inflation factors and exchange rate factors. The stochastic growth rates of
nominal exchange rates are given by14
E = Π Π∗
In the absence of restrictions on the balance sheet of the monetary fiscal
authority, which is the case under QE, the set of steady state equilibria
is indexed by the nominal pricing transition probabilities, ν(·|s), that can
be set arbitrarily; the inflation factors, pi(·|s), and exchange rate factors,
e(s′|s)/e(s), then adjust to implement the equilibrium.
In each country, the composition of the balance sheet of the monetary-
fiscal authority can be described by portfolio weights, δ(s′|s) (that is, 0 <
δ(s′|s) ≤ 1, and ∑s′ δ(s′|s) = 1 ), and scale factors h(s), such that
h(s)δ(s′|s) = T˜ (s′)(1 + pi(s′|s));
this is the case since the inflation factor is the rate of exchange of output
between a date-event and an immediate successor.
14Entry-by-entry multiplication is ⊗, while  is entry-by-entry division.
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The equilibrium condition, then reduces to
Q˜ = R−1N ⊗HΓ = R−1HN ⊗ Γ.
Here,
H = diag(. . . , h(s), . . .)
is the diagonal matrix of scale factors, and
Γ =
(
δ(s′|s)
T˜ (s′)
)
is the matrix of portfolio weights relative to the payoff of the balance sheet.
Monetary-fiscal policy conducted as CE sets the composition of the bal-
ance sheet; that is, it sets positive portfolio weights, δ(s′|s) > 0; claims
against the monetary-fiscal authority in real terms, T˜ (s), are determined,
at the steady-state, by fundamentals, and, as a consequence, under CE, the
matrix Γ is determined.
Since
N1S = 1S ⇔ H = (RQ˜ Γ)1S,
the Markov tradition matrix, N, is well defined (h 0) and determinate; it
follows that the equilibrium is determinate as well.
Under conventional monetary-fiscal policy, the portfolio of the monetary-
fiscal authority consists of treasury bills, nominally risk-free bonds of short
maturity. Here, this corresponds to one-period nominally risk-free bonds:
δ(s′|s) = 1/S. 
The indeterminacy of stationary equilibria that we obtain is a signifi-
cantly bigger problem than the non-stationary one shown in the previous
section. This is because policy-oriented models often restrict their definition
of equilibrium to a bounded space, and presume that this delivers determi-
nacy under money-supply targeting or a Taylor-type rule. Our results under
QE show that this is not enough to uniquely determine an equilibrium. If pol-
icy set the path of state-contingent money supply, rather than interest rates
as we have, then the indeterminacy would appear in the path of interest rates
and would be have real effects.
If interest rates in each country were not set exogenously, but as a function
of h(s), this is a “Taylor rule”, and indeterminacy persists. This is because
interest rates would then depend on the entire distribution of expected infla-
tion without targeting one in particular. In other words, policy that specifies
the path of nominal interest rates as a function of expected inflation, does
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not pin down the stochastic path of inflation.15 Similarly, neither would ad-
equate consideration of the interest-elasticity of money-demand resolve the
indeterminacy.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Curdia and Woodford (2011) ob-
tain determinacy in a closed economy conducting a policy of QE by setting
the portfolio weights in the balance sheet of the monetary-fiscal authority to
depend on realised variables. Similarly, if portfolio weights were chosen to
target a specific path of nominal exchange rates (provided the other country
targets domestic inflation or conducts traditional policy or CE) then determi-
nacy would obtain and highlights the relationship between the composition
of assets and the determination of asset prices, inflation and exchange rates16.
Furthermore, this is consistent with our exposition of CE. On the other hand
if the portfolio weights are chosen by policy to depend on endogenous nominal
variables at s′, such as exchange rate or foreign currency value of domestic
wealth then indeterminacy obtains17.
It is worth pointing out that the indeterminacy we obtain is not a conse-
quence of the stochastic nature of our economy per se, but rather that, given
the uncertainty, the non-colliniarity of assets traded by the monetary-fiscal
authority. In a related note, McMahon et al. (2012), we examine the conse-
quences of the recent European Central Bank (ECB) policy on purchasing
the debt of member countries (Outright Monetary Transactions, or OMT). If
the bonds purchased by the ECB are not expected to default, which such a
policy is in fact designed to support, then the bonds of the member countries
are collinear and there is no requirement to provide ex-ante restrictions on
the composition of assets held by the ECB. If however such a policy cannot
prevent default, then the bonds are no longer collinear and short-term in-
terest rates may no longer be sufficient to determine the path of Eurozone
inflation.
Unconvential Monetary Policy and Premia
In cash-in-advance specifications, liquidity costs generate a wedge between
cash and credit goods, and consequently affect marginal utilities and equilib-
rium prices. This generates a positive correlation between the (real) stochas-
15That the Taylor rule does not depend on realized rates of inflation is appropriate for
(stochastic) steady-state equilibria.
16See Magill and Quinzii (2014b) and Adao, Correia, and Teles (2014), where explicit
targets for asset prices, independent of equilibrium, pin down portfolio weights.
17Suppose that the portfolio weights depended on expectations of the foreign value of
real domestic wealth: δ(s′|s) = [T˜ (s′)(1 + pi∗(s′|s))]/[∑s′ T˜ (s′)(1 + pi∗(s′|s))] ⇒ h(s) =
e(s′|s)∑s′ T˜ (s′)(1 + pi∗(s′|s)).
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tic discount factor and expected nominal interest rates, and, as a conse-
quence, a real risk premium that causes the term structure of interest rates
to lie above levels predicted by the pure expectation hypothesis. In a closed
economy, Espinoza et al. (2009) show that the risk-premia generated by the
non-neutrality of monetary policy exist in addition to the ones derived from
the stochastic distribution of endowments as presented in Lucas (1978) and
Breeden (1979). They provide a potential explanation for the Term Premium
Puzzle18. In an open economy, the argument extends, whereby the path of
nominal interest rates in each country can affect real risk-premia on the path
of nominal exchange rates as in Peiris and Tsomocos (2015)19. This is in
contrast to equilibrium models where monetary policy is neutral, as in Lucas
(1982), where, as risk premia are constant, interest rate differentials move
one-for-one with the expected change in the exchange rate. We extend this
literature by showing how the composition of the monetary-fiscal authority
balance sheet, in addition to policy setting the path of interest rates or money
supplies, affects premia in the bond and currency markets. The premia that
we obtain is purely nominal though our results extend to economies with
incomplete markets and price rigidities, in which case the premia would also
be real.
Term Premia:
Our analysis utilises the stationary equilibrium results obtained in the pre-
vious section.
Consider the price, in the home country, of a two-period nominally riskless
18There is a large literature on the difficulties of the uncovered interest parity holding
empirically. The forward premium anomaly, as documented by Fama (1984), Hodrick
(1987), and Backus et al. (1995) among others, states that when a currency’s interest rate
is high, that currency is expected to appreciate. Roughly speaking, the expected change
in the exchange rate is constant and interest differentials move approximately one-for-one
with risk premia.
19In that paper, there are two countries each inhabited by a representative agent and
who must use domestic money for domestic trades, such as in the present paper. A cash-in-
advance structure means that nominal interest rates affect the wedge between the marginal
utilities of income and expenditure. Furthermore, markets are incomplete and agents may
default upon their nominal obligtations. Monetary policy, by altering the wedge, affects
the volume of real trade, and hence marginal utilities, default probabilities and implied
risk neutral probabilities. Consequently, there is a covariance between nominal exchange
rates, and real and nominal premia which affects the difference between the risk-neutral
and objective expectation of future exchange rates. In the present paper, this difference
is generated purely by altering the composition of assets traded by the monetary-fiscal
authorities in each country.
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bond, at state s:
q2(s) =
∑
s′
q(s′|s)
∑
s′′|s′
q(s′′|s′) = 1
1 + r(s)
∑
s′|s
ν(s′|s)
1 + r(s′|s)
In other words, the forward rate gives the risk-neutral expectation of the
future one-period interest rates:
q2(s)(1 + r(s)) =
∑
s′|s
ν(s′|s)
1 + r(s′|s) .
The term premia are then described by∑
s′|s
ν(s′|s)− f(s′|s)
1 + r(s′|s) .
The stationary distribution of the term premia is
N ⊗R− F ⊗R = [((RQ˜ Γ)1S)−1RQ˜ Γ− F ]⊗R.
Recall that Γ is the matrix of portfolio weights relative to the payoff of the
balance sheet of the monetary-fiscal authority. Hence, given the fundamen-
tals of the economy, and a given path of one-period interest rates, the term
premia depends on the composition of the monetary-fiscal authority balance
sheet. More precisely, a correlation is generated between the nominal martin-
gale measure and nominal interest rates which results in risk-neutral pricing
being systematically biased (from subjective pricing alone).
Currency Premia:
Recall the Uncovered Interest Parity equation in state s
e∗(s)
1 + r(s)
1 + r∗(s)
=
∑
s′|s
ν(s′|s)e∗(s′|s),
where
∑
s′|s ν(s
′|s)e∗(s′|s) is the risk neutral expectation of exchange rates.
The realised distribution of exchange rates implies an (objective) expectation
of
∑
s′|s f(s
′|s)e∗(s′|s). The difference between these two will be the currency
premium. The stationary distribution of the premium is:
N ⊗ E − F ⊗ E = N ⊗ Π Π∗ − F ⊗ Π Π∗ =
RQ˜ Π∗ − F ⊗ Π Π∗ = (RQ˜− F ⊗ Π) Π∗ =
(RQ˜− F ⊗HΓ) (H∗Γ∗) =
(RQ˜− F ⊗ (RQ˜ Γ)1SΓ) ((R∗Q˜∗  Γ∗)1SΓ∗).
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This is entirely in terms of real variables and nominal interest rates and
portfolio weights set by policy. Furthermore there is a clear separation be-
tween home and foreign variables and policy parameters. It follows then
that stationary portfolio weights chosen in each country correspond to vary-
ing premia in the currency markets. The sign and magnitude of the premium
can be chosen arbitrarily by appropriate choices of nominal interest rates and
portfolio weights. Note that varying the nominal interest rates results in the
premium having a real (risk) component while varying the portfolio weights
affects the stationary distribution of inflation and exchange rates which is
purely nominal. From the equation, it is clear that the joint distribution of
interest rates and inflation across countries matters in addition to the mean
and variance of the inflation process in each country.
We have considered only interest rate targeting; the results do extend to
policies that target the paths of money supplies. In that case, although the
path of money is given by policy, fluctuations in demands for assets affect
the path of interest rates and changes in the composition of monetary-fiscal
authority portfolio has real effects. That is, in a money growth targeting
regime, the path of real risk-premia depends on the composition of assets
held by the monetary-fiscal authority.20
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